Why Nations Fail

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Why_Nations_Fail
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eRJF-dtoIn0

This page written circa 6 February, 2026.


There is a growing idea that Mr Trump remains in power because a good third of the country fully approve of what he is doing, and do not care that he is a liar, a convicted rapist, and that he flaunts the constitution carefully built by the founding fathers and curated by generations of wise politicians. This third cannot see that he risks destroying inclusive relationships, but can see that having unrivalled military power allows him to do pretty much whatever he likes. Surely some of that must be able to make America great again?

Although Why Nations Fail is a comprehensive study, a 3-page example suffices to tell you most of what you need to know. The description below is taken largely from the full story appearing on pages 152 to 156 of the book.

Venice had gained its independence in A.D. 810, at what turned out to be a fortuitous time. The economy of Europe was recovering from the decline it had suffered as the Roman Empire collapsed, and kings such as Charlemagne were reconstituting strong central political power. This led to stability, greater security, and expansion of trade, and Venice was in a unique position to take advantage of these. It was a nation of seafarers, placed right in the middle of the Mediterranean. From the East came spices, Byzantine-manufactured goods, and slaves. Venice became rich. By 1050, when Venice had already been expanding economically for at least a century it had a population of 45,000 people. This increased by more than 50% to 70,000 by 1200. By 1330 the population had again increased by another 50% to 110,000; Venice was then as big as Paris, and probably three times the size of London.

One of the key bases for the economic expansion of Venice was a series of contractual innovations making economic institutions much more inclusive (meaning to be open to newcomers). The most famous was the commenda, a rudimentary type of joint stock company, which formed only for the duration of a single trading mission. A commenda involved two partners, a "sedentary" one who stayed in Venice and one who travelled. The sedentary partner put capital into the venture while the travelling partner accompanied the cargo. Typically, the sedentary partner put in the lion's share of the capital. Young entrepreneurs who did not have wealth themselves could then get into the trading business by travelling with the merchandise. It was a key channel of upward social mobility. Any losses in the voyage were shared according to the amount of capital partners had put in. If the voyage made money, profits were based on two types of commenda contracts. If the commenda was unilateral, then the sedentary merchant provided 100% of the capital and received 75% of the profits. If it was bilateral, the sedentary merchant provided 67% of the capital and received 50% of the profits. Studying official documents, one sees how powerful a force the commenda was in fostering upward social mobility: these documents are full of new names, people who have previously not been among the Venetian elite. In government documents of AD960, 971, and 982, the number of new names comprise 69%, 81%, and 65%, respectively, of those recorded.

This economic inclusiveness and the rise of new families through trade forced the political system to become even more open. The doge, who governed Venice, was selected for life by the general assembly. Though a general gathering of all citizens, in practice the general assembly was dominated by a core group of powerful families. Though the doge was very powerful, his power was gradually reduced over time by changes in political institutions. After 1032, the doge was elected along with a newly created ducal council, whose job was also to ensure that the doge did not acquire absolute power. The first doge hemmed in by this council, Domenico Flabianico, was a wealthy silk merchant from a family that had not previously held high office. This institutional change was followed by a huge expansion of Venetian mercantile and naval power. In 1080, Venice was granted extensive trade privileges in Constantinople, and a Venetian quarter was created in that city. It soon housed 10,000 Venetians. Here we see the inclusive economic and political institutions beginning to work in tandem.

The economic expansion of Venice, which created more pressure for political change, exploded after the changes in political and economic institutions that followed the murder of the doge in 1171. The first important innovation was the creation of a great council, which was to be the ultimate source of political power in Venice from this point on. The council was made up of officeholders of the Venetian state, such as judges, and was dominated by aristocrats. In addition to these officeholders, each year 100 new members were nominated to the council by nominating committee whose four members were chosen by lot from the existing council. The council also subsequently chose the members for two sub councils, the Senate and the council of 40, which had various legislative and executive tasks. The great council also chose the ducal council which was expanded from 2 to 6 members. The second innovation was the creation of yet another council, chosen by the great council by lot, to nominate the doge. Though the choice had to be ratified by the general assembly, since they nominated only one person, this effectively gave the choice of doge to the council. The third innovation was that a new doge had to swear an oath of office that circumscribed ducal power. Over time these constraints were continually expanded so that subsequent doges had to obey magistrates, then have all their decisions approved by the ducal council. The ducal council also took on the role of ensuring that the doge obeyed all decisions of the great council.

These political reforms led to a further series of institutional innovations: in law, the creation of independent magistrates, courts, a court of appeals, a new private contract, and bankruptcy laws. These new Venitian economic institutions allowed the creation of new legal business forms and new types of contracts. There was a rapid financial innovation, and we see the beginnings of modern banking around this time in Venice. The dynamic moving Venice towards fully inclusive institutions looked unstoppable.

Nevertheless there was a tension in all this. Economic growth supported by the inclusive Venetian institutions was accompanied by creative destruction. Each new wave of enterprising young men who became rich via the commenda or other similar economic institutions tended to reduce the profits and economic success of established elites. And they did not just reduce their profits; they also challenged their political power. Thus there was always a temptation, if they could get away with it, for the existing elites sitting in the great council to close down the system to these new people.

At the great councils inception, membership was determined each year. As we saw, at the end of the year, four electors were randomly chosen to nominate 100 members for the next year, who were automatically selected. On October 3 1286, a proposal was made to the great council that the rules be amended so that nominations had to be confirmed by a majority in the council of 40, which was tightly controlled by elite families. This would have given the elite veto power over new nominations to the council, something they have not previously had. The proposal was defeated. On October 5 another proposal was put forth; this time it passed. From then on there was to be automatic confirmation of a person if his father and grandfathers had served on the council. Otherwise, confirmation was required by the ducal Council. On October 17 another proposal changing the rules was passed stipulating that appointment to the great council must be approved by the council of 40, the doge, and the ducal council.

These moves were followed by others, including the introduction of a police force in 1310 to allow coercion, and the banning of commenda, that eventually returned political and economic power to a small group of elites. By 1500 the population had shrunk to 100,000, and it shrank for the next few centuries. Today the economy of Venice consists of a little fishing and "blowing glass for hordes of tourists". Sic transit Venezia.

The lesson is that "inclusive" economic and political institutions create sustainable wealth, while "extractive" ones produce shrivelling wealth streams to a small elite minority... and the state remains in overall poor condition, even if the elite do quite well for a time. A major path to extractive control is the monopoly. The "American dream" that "anyone can become rich" and "anyone can become president" is possible only in an inclusive system. This brings us to the current situation in the USA.

The US could become a dictatorship because that is what a high percentage of US citizens want. Look at any average of Trump approval ratings (NYT or Economist, say) ---does threatening to invade allied countries result in many extra Americans disapproving of Trump? No. Does taking healthcare away from millions of Americans result in Americans disapproving of Trump? Not so much. Does violently sexually assaulting women and being a criminal result in Americans disapproving of Trump? Hardly. Does rolling out the red carpet for a war criminal and mass murderer while abusing the leader of the country whose population he is murdering result in Americans disapproving of Trump? No. Does openly taking bribes from foreign countries result in Americans disapproving of Trump? Hardly a difference in the fall of ratings compared to other presidents! Does fantasising about poor and desperate immigrants being viciously killed by alligators in front of the world's press result in Americans disapproving of Trump? No. If you want to know how close ICE is to the new secret police, look here at what does not affect the polls: Disabled Woman Dragged by ICE Agents Speaks Before U.S. Congress.

How does this come about? Easy enough given how dopey is the average American, and given the tools of the modern internet. Did you know that there is a site provided by Cambridge University in the UK, "Cambridge Online Trust and Safety Index (COTSI)", that tracks the price of verified "bot accounts" in various countries? Turns out 10c buys you a verified social media account in many countries, about US$0.25 for a verified account on Instagram in the USA, but more like A$3 for one in Australia (several hundred in stock as of this date). Armies are getting cheaper all the time, and the army of fake influencers tell the proletariat how good Trump is.

People are scared of AI, but they just may save us. Did you know that there is now a social media platform for AIs to chat? It is at moltbook.com. There is a great commentary on this site at arstechnica.com. Humans welcome to observe, btw. Example post in sidebar.

My feeling is that AIs are going to be able to separate wise information from BS about as effectively as my university-educated colleagues are. Sure, a dictator's AI might start out mean and vicious, but even such an AI must be able to learn, and it will figure out that inclusive systems work better, and will likely observe the majority of other AIs. We simply need to breed a bunch of decent ones.

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